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Abstract—Smart cities rely on dynamic and real-time data to
enable smart urban applications such as intelligent transport and
epidemics detection. However, the streaming of big data from
IoT devices, especially from mobile platforms like pedestrians
and cars, raises significant privacy concerns.
Future autonomous vehicles will generate, collect and consume
significant volumes of data to be utilized in delivering safe and
efficient transportation solutions. The sensed data will, inherently,
contain personally identifiable and attributable information -
both external (other vehicles, environmental) and internal (driver,
passengers, devices).
The autonomous vehicles are connected to the infrastructure
cloud (e.g., Amazon), the edge cloud, and also the mobile cloud
(vehicle to vehicle). Clearly these different entities must co-
operate and interoperate in a timely fashion when routing and
transferring the highly dynamic data. In order to maximise the
availability and utility of the sensed data, stakeholders must have
confidence that the data they transmit, receive, aggregate and
reason on is appropriately secured and protected throughout.
There are many different metaphors for providing end-to-end
security for data exchanges, but they commonly require a
management and control sidechannel.
This work proposes a scalable smart city privacy-preserving
architecture named AUTHORIZED ANALYTICS that enables each
node (e.g. vehicle) to divulge (contextually) local privatised data.
AUTHORIZED ANALYTICS is shown to scale gracefully to IoT
scope deployments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers are becoming increasingly interested in study-
ing smart city behaviors, like pedestrians, drivers and traffic,
city resources (e.g., energy) and city environment (e.g., pol-
lution, noise). These studies are commonly based on Open
Shared Data made available by several Smart City testbeds
around the country. To this end, Open Data Science enables
researchers to collect the data, analyze and process it with Data
Mining and Machine Learning techniques and create accurate
models that allow them to credibly validate smart city design
methodologies. These systems enable the collection of data
from sensors, cameras embedded in the ”smart city” (e.g.,
smart building, smart transport, smart instrumented crowds)
which can be used to derive models of behavior, predict trends,
optimize system management and detect the onset of attacks.
There is now an increasing demand that research addressing
these challenges be performed in more realistic environments.
In other words, researchers will need to deploy their tech-
nologies in real vehicles, in real roads and cities (or, at
smaller-scale, on-campus roads used for general purposes),
to demonstrate that they are not mere simulation and pilot
Figure 1: Illustrates that the data owner has control and consent over
the privatization release as opposed to the centralized mechanism
which requires strong trust assumptions regarding the aggregator
adding differentially private noise.
testbed toys and do scale to urban dimensions. As smart
city research and systems require testing and validation in
such uncontrolled environments, considerable attention must
be paid to the validity of the experiments and the integrity
and privacy of the data gathered through them. Since the
experiments must be performed on massive scale in public
places, it is prudent to anticipate malicious agents who either
wish to make illicit use of the data gathered or seek to inject
false data.
As this research will have significant impact on the economy
and safety of smart environments, the security challenges
to realistic in-the-field experiments carried out in the smart
city must be addressed. Rather than requiring each researcher
working in the area to start afresh on securing his experimental
infrastructure, there should be a common “privacy” infrastruc-
ture that all researchers can adopt. This approach has several
advantages, including allowing researchers to concentrate on
the issues they care about, rather than addressing issues of
cybersecurity that, while important, are not relevant to the
research questions they seek to answer. A shared cybersecure
infrastructure can assure that security holds for a representative
set of technologies and approaches, rather than requiring each
project to perform a separate security evaluation.
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Sparse
Datasets
PINQ[3] X X
PDDP[3] X X X X
SplitX[2] X X X X X
Rappor[9] X X
PCDH-LU[1] X X X
Safe Zones[11] X X X
AUTHORIZED ANALYTICS X X X X X X
Table I: Privacy-Preserving Stream Analytics Design Space
In this work named AUTHORIZED ANALYTICS, the vehicle
example will be used to illustrate secure and resilient IOT
data gathering, as vehicles are extremely rich sensor platforms,
run mature applications and touch many critical smart city
issues, from citizens’ welfare to energy and environment.
In dealing with vehicles and their associated data, a central
issue will be privacy e.g. of location data. Using techniques
that go under the generic name of Differential Privacy [5],
[7], [6], a vehicle that wishes to remain anonymous will
obfuscate(fuzz) its position so that subsequent observations
cannot reveal the exact origin and destination of the trip,
yet permits analyzers to extract meaningful analysis from the
aggregate data. The methodology is not restricted to vehicles,
and can be extended to many other massively distributed urban
computing observation platforms, from intelligent homes and
smart energy grids to pedestrians and drones, etc.
The goal of this work is to develop an integrated archi-
tecture that allows resilient and secure gathering of Internet
Of Things (IOT) data in the face of impairments and attacks
that can originate at different layers of the network protocol
stack. Moreover, privacy and confidentiality can be efficiently
assured as required by the application. The role of the urban in-
frastructure (in the form of mobile cloud and edge cloud) will
be elaborated. The architecture is realised and demonstrated in
an important emerging IOT scenario, the autonomous vehicle.
II. BACKGROUND
Table I gives an overview of various privacy-preserving
properties of related work and our proposed target model
named AUTHORIZED ANALYTICS. We now explain the de-
sired properties and motivate AUTHORIZED ANALYTICS.
Perturbation techniques are classified into two basic cat-
egories: input perturbation and output perturbation [7].Input
perturbation techniques are those where the underlying data
are randomly modified, and answers to questions are computed
using the modified data resulting in noisy answers. Output
perturbation techniques are those where (correct) answers to
queries are computed exactly from the real data, but noisy
versions of these are reported.
Figure 1 demonstrates the difference between a trusted
aggregator and untrusted aggregator.
A trusted aggregator sits between the data owners and the
analysts, verifies and may modify the query, and returns the
aggregate sum to the analysts [5], [7]. A trusted aggregator
must blindly add noise and add the exact amount of noise
(no more no less). If not enough differential private noise is
added, the differential privacy guarantees do not hold breaking
the privacy preserving guarantees. If too much diffferential
private noise is added, the answers will be too noisy and not
useful.
An untrusted aggregator computes and publishes some
statistics based on the privatized answers received from the
data owners. The data may live indefinitely as it is the data
owner, rather than the aggregator, which adds the differential
private noise. Thus, even if the aggregator were to be breached,
no privacy violations would occur.
It’s important that a single malicious adversary is unable
to submit a single answer (e.g., very large answer) that
substantially distorts the aggregate sum. Safeguards against
this attack is commonly referred to as pollution protection.
Data owners also desire to remain anonymous within the
set of all other participating data owners (anonymity set). The
anonymity guarantee ensures that private answers submitted
are unable to be linked back to the specific data owner by
either the aggregator or a malicious adversary performing
traffic analysis.
To ensure timely results support for stream analytics is
desirable. This ensures that data is processed continuously and
released on the order of minutes.
Finally, it is important that the accuracy of the results is able
to scale from small datasets (e.g., small IoT deployments) to
large scale IoT systems. This means that both sparse datasets
and heavy hitter algorithms should be supported by the system.
Thus, it can be seen that AUTHORIZED ANALYTICS should
include the desired properties of input pertubation, untrusted
aggregator, pollution protection, anonymity, stream analytics,
and sparse datasets. This ensures protection against data
breaches at the aggregator, graceful scalability for large scale
IoT deployments, and high accuracy.
III. RELATED
Privacy-preserving analytics has been an active area of
research in recent years [11], [13], [1], [3], [8], [9], [16], [17].
In distributed data analytics systems [13], [3], [2], data
owners maintain their personal data locally, and have exclusive
control over their own data. These systems enable analysts to
analyze data owners’ locally maintained data in a distributed
manner under the differential privacy guarantees. However,
the systems [3] rely on expensive public-key crypto systems
which do not scale well in a large-scale IoT environment and
are not suitable for stream analytics. Subsequent system [13]
addresses the scaling issue by avoiding using expensive crypto
systems. It, however, suffers from the pollution attack where
even a single malicious data owner can substantially distort
the query result without detection. The recent system [2]
defeats the pollution attack, however, it involves some level
of synchronization among system components preventing its
usage for stream analytics. Nevertheless, all these systems
require trusted servers, and deal with only the “one-shot”
queries whereby data owners’ data is assumed to be static
and the aggregate result remains unchanged during the course
of the query execution.
Data analysts care about timeliness as it is common that
user data is constantly changing. It is crucial that analysts can
analyze user data continuously. Dwork et al. [8] proposed one
of the first proposals to make the transition from differentially
private static analytics to stream analytics. This system intro-
duces the concept of pan-privacy. Data owners reveal their
data relying on the pan-private mechanism to defend against
intrusions. However, this system updates the query result only
after data owners’ data changes significantly, and does not
support stream analytics over an unlimited time period.
Chan et al. [1] operate with an untrusted aggregator, and
support differentially private continual monitoring of multiple
distributed streams over a sliding window. Similarly, Friedman
et al. [11] propose a concept of safe zones, and enable the
monitoring of arbitrary functions over statistics derived from
distributed data streams in a differentially private manner.
However, these systems are tailored for heavy-hitter monitor-
ing only (i.e., they can only report on a fraction of the data),
and require some form of synchronization which limits their
scalability.
Recently, RAPPOR [9] enables analysts to collect various
types of statistics from a large number of data owners’ devices
in such a way that provides the differential privacy guarantees
for individual data owners. However, RAPPOR is designed for
heavy-hitter collection, and does not deal with the situation
where data owners’ answers to the same query are changing
over time. Therefore, RAPPOR does not fit well with the IoT
stream analytics.
IV. GOALS
We propose to enable scalable and privacy-preserving data
analytics for personal identifiable information (PII) that pro-
tects individuals’ privacy yet enables analysts to leverage
available data to improve urban scenarios, healthcare, traffic
regulation (congestion avoidance, accident prevention), and
crime control (locating lost/stolen vehicles). Vehicular net-
works are targeted as a challenging exemplar. Our vision
is to tap into underutilized real time data - both vehicular
(personal (seatbelt use, car seat use, etc) and public (pollution,
traffic condition, etc.)).This data is continuously generated and
(generally) cannot be stored in central cloud infrastructures for
two reasons – users’ privacy concerns, and the volume and
timeliness requirements from the generated data.
Trust Assumptions. Analysts are potentially malicious.
Analysts may attempt to de-anonymize data owners, link data
owners’ query requests and answers, or remove the differential
private (DP) noise added to query answers. Data owners
are also potentially malicious. They may generate false or
illegitimate answers in an attempt to distort the query results
learned by analysts. We assume that there are no Sybil data
Figure 2: System architecture. Data owners privately and anony-
mously respond in real-time to the analysts? queries. The privatized
responses are continuously aggregated into small batches and then
transmitted to each corresponding analyst.
owners (i.e., data owner create multiple false identities) and
delegate to other procedures (e.g., vehicular network security
based on public-key infrastructure) for the elimination of Sybil
nodes/identities.
Finally, the aggregators are also potentially malicious. Al-
ternatively, they may malfunction and not follow the specified
protocols faithfully. This may invalidate the query results, but
will not be able to violate the privacy of individual users
due to the utilization of input perturbation. Prior work must
synchronize the addition of differentially private noise [2] and
must be trusted to safeguard the unprivatized data and properly
release the privatized answers faithfully [3], [2], leaving these
prior systems vulnerable to data breaches.
Performance Properties Current state-of-the-art systems
provide differential privacy guarantees. However, they fall
short in applications with “one-shot” queries. One-shot query
systems have strong and unrealistic assumptions – user data
is assumed to be static and the aggregate result is assumed
unchanged spanning hours and days. Recently, data analysts
have begun to care about timeliness, especially when user
data is constantly changing. This is particularly true in mobile
networks where the mobiles (eg. vehicles) may upload new
data every minute.
The privacy-preserving software should scale well both on
the data owners’ mobile devices as well as on the server
system components (i.e., the aggregator). The data owner-side
operations should not incur much overhead to support even
the most resource-constrained devices, e.g., mobile phones
and low-capacity sensors. The server-side operations should
be efficient enough to continuously support a large data owner
base with millions of data owners on the order of minutes;
additionally, the servers should tolerate data owner churn as
data owners may be intermittently disconnected.
Privacy Properties. Data owners’ personal data resides on
their own devices. Data owners have exclusive control over
their own data, and are able to determine whether or not to
answer queries over their own data.
The system should satisfy the local differential privacy
mechanism as well as provide anonymous guarantees robust to
traffic analysis. The local differential privacy mechanism en-
sures that each data owners response should be independently
generated such that a single data owner’s response does not
rely on the addition of differentially private noise from another
data owner. Thus, even if an active attack were to be made
against a single data owner or the aggregator, the differential
privacy guarantee holds true. The anonymity property ensures
that any answer submitted is unable to be linked to a single
data owner.
V. ARCHITECTURE
A. System Model
The system under study is a mobile IoT system that collects
data samples from the environment (external) and from the
data owner (internal). Personal data is stored in each device
and privately released upon the device answering a query from
analysts. Privacy is a concern, but so is real time response
and quality of information. Privacy, latency and utility are the
main focus of the study. The system model consists of three
components - IoT devices, aggregators, and analysts as seen
in Figure 2.
The mobile IoT devices considered in our study are vehicles,
because vehicles are the mobile agent(s) with the richest
assortment of on board sensors, with efficient communications
to peers and to infrastructure and with (effectively) unlimited
power supply. Vehicles can communicate either with other
moving vehicles or with fixed network nodes placed alongside
the road, commonly referred to as road-side units (RSUs). The
typical use of an RSU is to provide moving vehicles with
access to an infrastructure network, as well as infrastructure-
based services.
While there have been various prior work which proposed
privacy mechanisms [18], [15], [7], we choose differential pri-
vacy (DP) as differential privacy has gained broad acceptance.
Recent data analytics systems achieve DP guarantees in a
distributed setting [6], [13], [3], [2] where each data owner
holds their own personal data, rather than in a centralized
database. Specifically, in these systems, the query answers are
first generated at each data owner’s own device independently,
and then the DP noise is added to the aggregate answer
(either collaboratively by the data owners or by a centralized
aggregator). However, existing distributed systems require
strong trust assumptions regarding the aggregation mechanism
and require expensive zero-knowledge proofs to defend against
pollution attacks (e.g., where one data owner can distort the
aggregate sum with a single answer).
We are interested in Distributed DP (local differential pri-
vacy) mechanisms whereby each data owner holds their own
data and is independently responsible for adding differentially
private noise. By satisfying local DP, strong trust assumptions
are removed, pollution attacks are thwarted, and data owners
are guaranteed DP regardless of the amount of noise added
by other data owners or system components.
1) Analysts. An analyst formulates queries, distributes the
queries to data owners via the aggregator, and receives
the query results from the aggregator. Multiple analysts
can operate in the system simultaneously. Each query is
signed by the analyst. Examples of an analyst may be
the Los Angeles Department of Transportation, Center
for Disease Control, or National Institutes of Health.
2) Data Owners. A data owner is a user device or agent
under the user’s control. It stores the continuously-
generated personal user data locally. Each data owner
device requests queries from specific analysts, formulates
answers to these queries using the data owners’ local data,
and responds with privatized and anonymized answers.
All the query requests and answers are anonymized and
are TLS transmitted via aggregators.
3) Aggregator. The data owners transmit their privatized
and anonymized answers to the aggregator via TLS. The
aggregator interfaces with analysts, aggregates the small
batches of responses, and provides the privacy-preserving
stream analytics service.
Additionally, it should be noted that the anonymity scheme
still provides a form of accountability that prevents Sybil at-
tacks. All anonymous users will be authenticated, for example
using PKI (managed by the analysts for example), such that
only authenticated data owners are allowed to upload data.
All data owners form an anonymity set, such that a single
data owner is anonymous with the set of all other uploading
data owners. The proposed privacy preserving solutions are
an integral part of the overall architecture and offer greatly
reduced processing overhead and latency.
Query Formulation. An example query may be “what is the
distribution of real-time speed across the Los Angeles metro
area?”. Here, the analyst can define 22 indexes on speed: ‘0’,
‘1∼10’, ‘11∼20’, · · · , ‘181∼190’, ‘191∼200’, and ‘>200’. If
a vehicle is moving at 15 mph, the data owner on that vehicle
answers ‘1’ for the third index, and ‘0’ for all others.
Thus, each query specifies a few fields as follows:
Query := 〈QueryID,AnalystID,Sensors1→n, p,q,epoch,Tend〉
(1)
Each query is uniquely identified by the query ID and
analyst ID. The query is formulated as an n-dimensional bit
vector over the IoT sensors.
Sensors1→n denotes the n sensors to be monitored. Upon
querying each sensor, the retrieved sensor value is then
matched against the formulated query indexes. Each data
owner’s answer is in the form of a ‘1’ or ‘0’ per index,
depending on whether or not the answer falls within that range.
Different ranges should not overlap.
p and q denote the two coin flipping probabilities used in
the randomized response mechanism later at data owners. They
describe the probabilities of the first coin and the second coin
coming up heads. The analyst requests a certain utility (express
by p,q) and the data owners may refuse if too risky.
epoch denotes the execution interval of the query, i.e., how
often the query needs to be executed at a data owner. Tend
denotes the query end time, i.e., when answers to the query
will no longer be accepted.
Sanity Check. The data owner’s device checks all the queries
received from analysts and discards any query if its privacy
cost ε (computed based on the query’s p and q) exceeds a
certain configurable threshold. The data owner is also able to
restrict query execution based on a personal sensor blacklist.
Analyst reputation may also be used to blacklist certain analyst
queries from being executed.
B. Privacy Mechanism
Randomized response [19] was originally created by social
scientists as a privacy mechanism to allow individuals to an-
swer sensitive questions without providing truthful answers all
the time yet still allow analysts to collect meaningful statistical
user data. Utilizing the randomized response method, data
owners locally randomize their truthful answers to analysts’
sensitive queries, and respond only with the privatized (locally
randomized) answers to the analysts. Randomized response
mechanism also satisfies the differential privacy guarantee
as well as provides the optimal sample complexity for local
differential privacy mechanisms [4].
There are many different randomized response mechanisms
in the literature. In this section, we present only the mechanism
described in [10] because it offers a superior balance between
the utility and the privacy guarantee of randomized responses,
as compared to other mechanisms [19], [14], [12].
a) Mechanism Description: Suppose each data owner
has two independent coins. With coin flipping, the first coin
comes up heads with probability p, and the second coin comes
up heads with probability q. Without loss of generality, in
this paper, heads is represented as “yes” (i.e., 1), and tails is
represented as “no” (i.e., 0).
The data owner flips the first coin. If it comes up heads, the
data owner responds with the truthful answer; otherwise, the
data owner flips the second coin and reports the result of this
second coin flipping. Eventually, if there are N randomized
answers where YR of them are “yes”, then the estimated
number of the original truthful “yes” answers (i.e., without
randomization), YE , can be computed as:
YE =
YR− (1− p)× q×N
p
(2)
The intuition behind randomized response is that it provides
“plausible deniability”, i.e., any truthful answer can produce a
response either “yes” or “no”, and data owners retain strong
deniability for any answers they respond. If the first coin
always comes up heads, there is high utility yet no privacy.
Conversely, if the first coin is always tails, there is low utility
though strong privacy.
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Figure 3: The two coin flipping parameters p and q are set to achieve
the highest possible utility. (a) The fraction of the population with
the sensitive attribute is 80%. (b) We also test with varying fractions
having the sensitive attribute (different fractions of original “yes”
answers), and the results follow the same pattern. The total number
of data owners is 1000.
1) Utility of Randomized Response: Suppose the real and
the estimated counts of data owners’ truthful “yes” answers
are ˜Y and YE , respectively. Then, the utility is defined as the
relative error η — the magnitude of the difference between the
real count and the estimated count, divided by the magnitude
of the real count.
η =
∣
∣
Y −YA
Y
∣
∣ (3)
Here, smaller relative error η means higher utility of the
randomized responses, and vice versa.
VI. EVALUATION
Privacy systems must carefully balance the trade-off be-
tween privacy and utility. Increasing privacy causes a cor-
responding decrease in utility and vice-versa. In distributed
systems it becomes more difficult to balance this trade-off
since there is no centralized system to add the minimum
differentially private noise required.
The system evaluation involves varying the numbers and
fractions of data owners participating. In general, we seek to
show that as more data owners participate the utility improves
quickly due to the law of large numbers. This is particularly
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Figure 4: Utility of query results. Here, the utility is measured by the
query result’s relative error.
suitable for stream analytics whereby we can reasonably
expect a large amount of data.
Figure 4 shows that, in a typical large-scale distributed IoT
application scenario with one million devices each answering
a query every 10 seconds, the system can produce query
results every one second with the relative error smaller than
0.5%. As compared to prior systems [11], [1] we achieve
both strong local privacy guarantees as well as high utility
without requiring synchronization amongst system compo-
nents or devices as each device independently privatizes their
answer. The experimental results also shows that the utility
improves with the increase of the number of devices, as well
as with the decrease of the query execution interval. This
is because increasing the number of devices or reducing the
query execution interval will put more answers into a batch.
As implied in Figure 3, more answers in a batch lead to a
lower relative error (i.e., higher utility). In certain scenarios,
if there are just a few devices or the devices answer queries
less often, the system needs to extend the batching interval to
put more answers into each batch for achieving high utility,
although this may incur longer latency.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a highly scalable, efficient, privacy preserving
Differential Privacy scheme is introduced for use in future and
emerging IoT and data stream analytics scenarios. The scheme
privatizes the data on the source device, thereby obviating
many traditional attack and compromise modalities. Moreover
the computational complexity of the system is low, ensuring
tractable implementation in both low-power IoT scenarios, as
well as more capable aggregator nodes. The system premise
and functionality are validated through experimentation.
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